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The Life and Work of Jacob Hermann 
A Working Conference 
Part 2 (Ravello, September 28-29, 1990), 
and Part 3 (Pisa, February 25-26, 1991) 
By Fritz Nagel 
Bernoulli-Edition, "/o Universitiitsbibliothek, SchSnbeinstrasse 18, CH-4056 Basel, Switzerland 
Two sequels of the working conference on Jacob Hermann (1678-1733) announced in Historia 
Mathematics l&64-65, took place in Ravello and Pisa (Italy). They were again organized by Sandra 
Giuntini (Dipartimento di Matematica, Florence). 
At Ravello (Villa Rufolo) the following papers were presented and discussed: 
ANTONIO C. GARIBALDI (Genoa): La Phoronomia di Hermann, prima parte: I Principi della Mecca&a 
LIVIA GIACARDI (Turin): 11 De calculo integrali di Hermann 
ELISABETTA ULIVI (Florence): La geometria nell’opera di Hermann 
SILVIA ROERO (Turin): I rapporti di Hermann con gli Italiani durante il period0 padovano 
SILVIA MAZZONE (Rome): 11 carteggio fi-a Hermann e Grandi 
At Pisa (Dipartimento di Matematica dell’Universit&) the series of lectures was continued by the 
following papers: 
LUCIA GRUGNETTI (Cagliari): Hermann e le forze centrali, parte I [Hermann in discussion with Johann 
Bernoulli] 
SANDRA GIUNTINI (Florence): Hermann e le forze centrali, parte II [Hermann in discussion with 
Giuseppe Verzaglia] 
ALDO BRIGAGLIA (Palermo): 11 calcolo nella Phoronomia di Hermann 
There will be another sequel soon. 
Hegel and Newtonianism 
By M. J. Petry 
Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 3ooO DR Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands 
A conference on Hegel and Newtonianism, sponsored by the Istituto Italian0 
per gli Studi Filosofici, Naples, was held at Trinity College, Cambridge, August 
30-September 4, 1989. Its main purpose was to bring together Newton scholars 
and others working on the history of eighteenth century mathematics and natural 
science, and those Hegel scholars who have been calhng attention to the signifi- 
cance of his work on the foundations of mathematics and the general principles of 
the natural sciences. 
Four of the five sections were devoted to those branches of natural science in 
which Hegel attempted to bring about a reassessment of the Newtonian legacy. In 
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respect to each of the individual issues, a lecture on the eighteenth century Newton- 
ian approach was followed by another on the Hegelian response. In Mechanics 
there were papers on the circularity involved in defining mass in terms of density, 
the problem of fall, and experiments with the pendulum; in Astronomy, on univer- 
sal gravitation, forces and occult qualities, and the process of deduction by means 
of which the laws of motion and universal gravitation may be made to yield 
Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion; in Optics, on the nature of light, the 
reasons for rejecting the modification theory of colour, and the physical and 
physiological factors involved in coloured shadows; in Chemistry, on atomism in 
the explanation of the chemical process, the problem of chemical affinity, and 
chemistry and the organic sciences. In so far as these sections were concerned 
with mathematical issues, it was, therefore, with those of applied mathematics. 
One important general conclusion with respect to the relationship between pure 
and applied mathematics was that Newton and Hegel were in substantial agreement 
on the necessity of an exact definition of the systematic context of mathematical 
reasoning. Newton was well aware of the differences between the geometrical 
demonstrations of the Principia and those of the Opticks, and he realized that his 
mathematics threw no light at all upon his chemical researches. 
The most controversial issue raised regarding this relationship between pure 
and applied mathematics concerned Newton’s treatment of centripetal forces and 
the motion of bodies in eccentric conic sections in the first book (Sections II and 
III) of the Principiu. Hegel pointed out, as early as 1801, that Proposition I, 
Theorem I cannot be regarded as an adequate geometrical presentation of Kepler’s 
second law, since “it shows that the arcs as well as the areas are proportional to 
the times, whereas what should have been shown is that the areas alone are 
proportional to the times, and certainly not the arcs.” In his subsequent lectures 
he pointed out that in Section III Newton’s mathematical reasoning is not con- 
cerned with Kepler’s first law, that is to say the specific curve of the ellipse, but 
simply with the conic section in general: “the conditions which make the path of 
the body a specific conic section are constants; and their determination is made to 
depend upon an empirical circumstance, i.e. a particular position of the body at a 
certain point of time, and the fortuitous strength of the original impulse it is 
supposed to have received. In this way the circumstance which determines the 
curved line into an ellipse falls outside the formula which is supposed to be proved, 
and the attempt to prove it is never made.” His main point was, therefore, that in 
these sections of the Principia Newton was giving a mathematical description of 
empirical data, not providing a mathematical justification of Kepler’s laws. There 
would appear to be good reasons for thinking that Newton would probably have 
agreed. In his preface to the first edition of the Principia he had noted that 
“geometry is founded in mechanical practice, and is nothing but that part of 
universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of mea- 
suring. ’ ’ Most of the propositions of Book I, Section 3 are presented in the 
conditional mode, “if a body revolves in an ellipse . . . ,” “suppose a body to 
move in an hyperbola . . . , ” “if a body moves in the perimeter . . . ,” etc. 
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Nevertheless, Robert Weinstock (Department of Physics, Oberlin College, Ober- 
lin, Ohio) created quite a stir among the Newton scholars present with his paper 
“A Worm in Newton’s Apple,” in which he submitted Section III to close analysis 
and drew the conclusion that it contains no logically or mathematically valid proof 
that for non-straight-line motion, an inverse-square central force implies a conic- 
section orbit with one focus at the center of force. Bruce Brackenridge (Lawrence 
University, Appleton, Wisconsin), in “The Primary Challenge of Newton’s Prin- 
cipia: Universal Gravitation from Elliptical Orbits,” took up this issue, which he 
saw as a questioning of one of Newton’s most important accomplishments, and 
emphasized the mathematical validity of the manner in which Newton solved the 
“direct” problem of deriving the inverse-square law from the elliptical orbit. 
Since Weinstock had been concerned with the “inverse” problem of deriving the 
elliptical orbit from the inverse-square law, some of the subsequent discussion 
was at cross-purposes, but it was interesting to see how the issues at stake con- 
verged upon the basic Hegelian analysis of this aspect of Newton’s applied mathe- 
matics. 
The more purely mathematical treatment of centripetal forces and eccentric 
conic sections in the first book of the Principia was meant to lay the foundation 
for the treatment of the concrete and specific phenomena of the solar system in 
Book III. For Newton, therefore, mathematics was an abstraction from nature 
which is applied to data or concrete phenomena in order to make them more 
intelligible: “In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with 
their proportions consequent upon any conditions supposed; then, when we enter 
upon physics, we compare those proportions with the phenomena of Nature, that 
we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds of 
attractive bodies. And this preparation being made, we argue more safely concern- 
ing the physical species, causes and proportions of the forces.” (Principia, Bk. I, 
Sect. XI, Scholium). 
Hegel appreciated the merits of this Newtonian conception of mathematics and 
singled out the abstract or purely universal aspect of his conception of evanescent 
divisible quantities (Principia, Bk. I, Lemma XI, Scholium) for particular praise: 
“The thought cannot be more correctly determined than in the way Newton has 
stated it. . . He explains that he understands by these fluxions not indiuisibles (a 
form which was used by earlier mathematicians, Cavalieri and others, and which 
involves the concept of an intrinsical determinate quantum), but vanishing diuisi- 
bles; also not sums and ratios of determinate parts but the limits of sums and 
ratios. It may be objected that vanishing magnitudes do not have a final ratio, 
because the ratio before it vanishes is not final, and when it has vanished it is no 
longer a ratio. But by the ratio of vanishing magnitudes is to be understood not 
the ratio before which and after which they vanish, but with which they vanish. 
Similarly, the first ratio of nascent magnitudes is that with which they become.” 
(Science of Logic p. 255.) Hegel distinguished very sharply, however, between 
this abstract or purely universal aspect of the matter, which had to be dealt with 
as essentially a logical issue, and “those determinations which belong to the idea 
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of motion and velocity (from which, mainly, Newton took the name offluxions) 
because in them the thought does not appear in its proper abstraction but as 
concrete and mixed with non-essential forms.” Within the Hegelian scheme of 
things these more concrete or complex mathematical determinations have their 
proper context not within pure logic but within a systematic exposition of the 
science of mechanics (Encyclopaedia Sect. 259). 
Most of the purely mathematical papers delivered at the conference were con- 
cerned in one way or another with the issues raised by this Newtonian conception 
of mathematics and Hegel’s assessment of it. They fell into three main groups: 
those concerned with the merits of the geometry of the ancients as compared with 
those of the calculus; those which dealt with the problems surrounding the concept 
of infinitesimals; and those which explored the implications of the distinction 
between pure and applied mathematics. 
Adrian Moore (St. Hugh’s College, Oxford) in “The Method of Exhaustion as 
a Model for the Calculus,” presented a general survey of the method of exhaustion 
as established by Eudoxus and developed by Archimedes. He contrasted its rigour 
with the unsatisfactory nature of many of the early applications of the calculus, 
and by concentrating upon the problem of finding the slope of a tangent to a curve 
at a particular point he showed why Newton advocated a return to the method of 
the ancients. In the latter part of his paper he brought out Hegel’s awareness of 
the significance of the issues involved and presented his treatment of the subject 
as in many respects an anticipation of the work of Cauchy and Weierstrass. 
Antonio Moretto (Padua), in “Hegel on Greek Mathematics and the Calculus,” 
drew attention to the fact that Hegel was aware of the affinity between the work 
of Archimedes and that of Lagrange, and explained precisely why Hegel regarded 
it as possible for the infinitesimal calculus to attain the rigour of the geometry of 
the ancients. 
Niccolo Guicciardini (Milan), in “Newton and the British Newtonians on the 
Foundations of the Calculus,” pointed out that although Newton began by making 
use of the concept of an infinitesimal quantity, he abandoned it about 1670 for the 
kinematical concepts of fluxion and moment, and in the Principia made use of the 
method of limits in order to justify infinitesimal techniques. He went on to show that 
the early Newtonians failed to grasp Newton’s final thoughts on the foundations of 
the calculus and often defined a fluxion as an “infinitely little” quantity. Imre Toth 
(Regensburg), in “The Dialectical Structure of Zeno’s Arguments,” brought out 
the merits of Hegel’s lucid and constructive analysis of the arguments by which 
the followers of Parmenides attempted to prove the unreality of motion. His central 
thesis was that the main problem presented by the Paradox of Achilles and the 
tortoise is whether or not a definite property P, consistent with the definition of 
and assigned additionally to the recursively enumerable set H can also be assigned 
to the pre-existent transfinite telos T. He maintained that since there is no way of 
deciding one way or the other, it is an unsolvable problem, both the positive and 
the negative answer being consistent with the explicit premise of the argument. 
The open alternative can only be decided if an additional axiomatic sentence is 
included among the premises. 
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Ivor Grattan-Guinness (Middlesex Polytechnic), in “Varieties of Mechanics in 
the Eighteenth Century,” made the point that it would be wrong to think of the 
mechanical sciences and the associated mathematical techniques of the period as 
having been exclusively Newtonian. The general science of mechanics had several 
distinct aspects- molecular, corporeal, celestial, planetary, technological-and 
within each of them there were various traditions competing with each other in 
respect of generality of conception and efficacy of use. Louk Fleischhacker 
(Twente University), in “Mathematics and Mechanics in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Nature,” concentrated upon Hegel’s awareness of the gap that then existed be- 
tween pure mathematics and its applications. He pointed out that the essence of 
his attempt to overcome it lies in his treatment of quality, quantity, and measure 
in the Science of Logic. This treatment is not only a systematic analysis of the 
logical or categorial foundations of mathematics, it is also a sophisticated philoso- 
phy of science and provides us with a valuable method for assessing experimental 
work and establishing mathematical connections between measurable quantities. 
The papers read at the conference, together with an edited version of the 
discussions, are due to be published in book form. In many respects, the volume 
will constitute the sequel to Hegel und die Naturwissenschaften (Stuttgart 1987), 
which also included several papers on the significance of Hegel’s philosophy of 
mathematics. 
Report on the Second Austrian Symposium on the History of 
Mathematics: Mathematics-8 la mode? 
Neuhofen an der Ybbs, Lower Austria, 22 to 28 October 1989 
BY CHRISTA BINDER 
Institut fiir Technische Mathematik, Technische Universitlit Wien, Wiedner, Hauptstr, 8-10, A-1040 
Vienna, Austria 
The subtitle of the meeting was “Trends and Tendencies in Research, Teaching and Style.” The 
scientific program consisted of 19 lectures, all followed by extensive discussions on topics ranging 
from special questions raised by the lecture to general remarks on Mode in mathematics. We still do 
not know if there are, or were, Moden in the history of mathematics, but we know of some examples of 
fields which were considered to be modern and which did influence the development of mathematics. 
In addition to the scientific program, the Symposium included an excursion to the convent of Melk, 
where the participants had the possibility to visit an exposition on 900 years of Benedictines in Melk in 
the wonderfully baroque building and church and a further excursion to Sonntagsberg, a pilgrims’ 
church on a hilltop, also baroque, with a beautiful view over the landscape and a wonderful sunset. 
One of the less official highlights of the Symposium was an evening lecture of H. Wussing on science 
during the French Revolution, illustrated by slides of stamps. 
There were 30 participants and three accompanying persons from nine countries. A volume (approx- 
imately 120 pages) with short versions of the lectures is available from Christa Binder at the above 
address. 
